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JUSTICE, ITS NATURE AND ACTUALIZATION.
BY THE EDITOR.
IN the present number of The Open Court Dr. C. A. F. Lindorme,
of Atlanta, Georgia, discusses in an article entitled "Law and
Justice," problems which again and again present themselves to
people who have to complain about "the law's delay," and other
wrongs inflicted on poor suffering mankind in the attempt to do
justice; and the cure which he proposes is so simple that at first
sight it would seem an outrage on the intellect of our legislatures
that it was not introduced long ago. Similar propositions have
been made before by reformers all over the world, but the case is
not so simple as it appears, and there is a good reason why mankind
continues to remain in the same sorry plight.
Though progress has been made in details, the main point of
complaint that justice is a mere approximation, a makeshift, some-
times a compromise, remains as before,—as it was from the be-
ginning, and we may boldly prophesy, as it will be so long as time
endures.
Dr. Lindorme looks back upon a long life rich in experience
and perhaps in disappointments, but if he had the power to alter
our legal institutions, our court proceedings, the practices of our
lawyers, and the methods pursued in obtaining legal decisions, he
would presumably give no relief, and we fear that instead of re-
dressing the wrongs committed, he would only aggravate the pres-
ent evils of the system, the existence of which we would be the
last to deny.
Our legal institutions are far from perfect. Whoever has any
acquaintance with courts and the administration of justice, will
find much truth in the words which Goethe puts in the mouth of
Mephistopheles when instructing the freshman who interviews him
on the different university courses. Concerning the study of law
Mephistopheles says :*
* This version is adapted from Bayard Taylor's translation of "Faust."
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"All rights and laws are still transmitted
Like an infection of the race
;
To the preceding generation fitted,
They shift and move from place to place.
Wisdom turns folly, good to bad and worse.
Beneficence is changed into a curse.
Thou art a grandchild; woe to thee! The right
Born with thee is not yet in sight."
When thinking of the shortcomings of human affairs we ought
to consider a truth that is stated with perfect clearness only in the
great religion of the Btiddha, viz., that suffering is an inalienable
part of existence ; imperfection is inherent in the constitution of life ;
what is compound will be dissolved ; what is born must die ; and
ideals can only be approximated, never fully "attained. We will not
stop here to philosophize on the arguments of the Buddhist doctrine,
and will not discuss either their justification or their verification
from the standpoint of modern science. The fact may be conceded
that life is a struggle and all the blessings which we enjoy must be
procured by constant effort. Schopenhauer, the pessimist, claims
that there is no permanent enjoyment, and that life's pleasures
oscillate between tediousness and pain. We do not intend to ad-
vocate pessimism, but we wish to have this special truth of pessimism
well understood. Goethe, who was assuredly no pessimist, utters
the same truth, though from the standpoint of manliness ready to
combat the evils of life, when he makes Faust express the following
sentiments at the moment of his death
:
"Yes! to this thought I hold with firm persistence;
The last result of wisdom stamps it true:
He only earns his freedom and existence,
Who daily conquers them anew."
—Tr. by Bayard Taylor.
The freedom of a republic can only be bought by the price of
constant vigilance ; and a high standard of morality, civilization and
culture is to be maintained by continuous drudgery. Life is not an
essence, a thing which can be kept like a rare gem in the show-case
of a museum ; life is a function involving perpetual activity, and so
the continued sustenance of life means constant labor.
Schopenhauer is right in claiming that the life of mankind is
always an eking out of existence from hand to mouth ; the wealthy
are only comparatively, not absolutely, secure, for the totality of
life depends upon the constantly renewed work of harvesting and
distributing crops and changing raw materials into food and rai-
ment. Faust's conclusion is not to give up in despair but to accept
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the conditions with the assurance of a lighter, strong enough to
take up the struggle. He wants to see an energetic race able to cope
with the problems and difficulties of life, and so he has founded a
new colony gained by dykes from the marshy districts. He con-
tinues:
"Thus here, by dangers girt, shall glide away
Of childhood, manhood, age, the vigorous day
;
And such a throng I fain would see,
—
Stand on free soil among a people free
!
Then dared I hail the moment fleeing
:
'Ah, still delay—thou art so fair !'
The traces cannot of mine earthly being,
In aeons perish,—they are there !
—
In proud fore-feeling of such lofty bliss,
I now enjoy the highest moment,—this !"
—Tr. by Bayard Taylor.
Dr. Lindorme, seeing the wrongs of the law, thinks that they
can be righted, and we gladly grant that there is much room for
reform ; the law can become preventive instead of curative. It can
be made so as to encourage virtue and other good deeds and qual-
ities instead of pouncing on the wrong-doer after the evil has been
committed. Hygiene has reached the stage when the spread of
contageous diseases may be avoided, and there is no reason why our
legal institutions should not imitate the progress actualized to some
extent at least, by the medical profession. But with all possible im-
provements (which are most devoutly to be desired) we shall not be
able to square law and justice, and to abolish what Dr. Lindorme
calls the "three rights," the right of the plaintiff, the right of the
defendant, and the right of the judge,—to fuse them into one, a har-
monic union of civilized justice.
Dr. Lindorme says: "Nothing is easier in the world than to
do justice if the parties only want to do it." This is a mistake and
exactly for the reason that nothing in the world is more difficult
than to do justice, do we have law and courts of justice.
Dr. Lindorme continues : "There is never a party going to law
except for lack of justice." It would be more correct to say, "ex-
cept for the clash of different rights," for justice is an ideal and
the views of justice will be found to be a compromise between two
contending parties, both of whom insist on what they call their rights.
In other words justice is based upon a truce made between two
parties waging war, and, and in the same way it will be seen that
justice as it presents itself in the real world is ultimately based on
power, the power to enforce one's rights. A party which has no
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power has no right. This may seem barbarc^us to those who con-
demn struggle in itself as immoral and regard bodily existence as
the taint of original sin ; but let us look at facts squarely and recog-
nize them without equivocation. There is no case of law between
the lamb and the butcher. The sheep could gain a right only by
[)rotection. Being unable to defend itself it is at the butcher's
mercy. The Humane Society steps in to protect dumb creatures
against the brutality of cruel human beings, but its right to inter-
fere is, properly considered, based much more upon the advisability
of restraining the brute in man, than of sparing the animal pain.
Its main purpose, so far as law and the enforcement of law goes,
is concerned with the prevention of cruelty that by being committed
or being witnessed would brutalize human nature, rather than with
the protection of any right on the part of animals. The ultimate
right of ownership is a possession that can be maintained. The
primitive right to land is by occupation, just as the hunter's right
to his prey is by capture. If occupancy is disputed we have a
collision of rights which, in the age of savagery, was commonly
decided in battle, and the victor lays down the law.
On a close inspection it will become apparent that the power
to enforce one's claims can not be omitted from the conception of
justice, and it is not absent either in the courts where the common
will of society for good reasons, has definitely excluded any self-
assertion by the mailed fist. Mankind has found out by experience
that a state of universal war is not desirable and so the common
will replaces the club right still sanctioned in the Middle Ages by
the right based upon law ; but the right based upon law still remains
the right of the stronger. The common will which has created the
law, steps in to protect the weak in their claims because it is in the
interest of all,—of the tribe, of society, of the commonwealth, or
whatever be the greater power which enforces the law,—that the
weak should enjoy equal advantages with the strong. So long
as life remains a struggle, justice will be based upon the power of
maintaining one's right and any settlement of right or wrong will
partake of the nature of a truce made between two or several hostile
camps, of a compromise of conflicting interests, of an agreement
arrived at by opposed parties.
The idea of removing the struggle of the contending parties
from our courts of justice is not new. It has been attempted again
and again by idealists who deemed it wrong to settle a dispute by
the force of argument. It is obvious that he who has his case most
effectively represented is not always the man who is right, and so
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it happens that justice is sometimes thwarted. Vet the idea of jus-
tice is so simple ! Why not drop ah red tape of arguments and have
justice done in the most direct and straightforward way?
It is said that the second king- of Prussia, Frederick Wilham I,
a typical monarch of paternal government, who had the hest of
intentions to he a father to his people, was dissatisl'ied with the
delay of the law and the ponderous machinery of justice. Like Dr.
Lindorme he thought nothing easier in the world than to flo
justice, so he went into court to teach his judges a lesson and sat
on the bench to hear the arguments of the plaintiff and defendant.
He listened to the plaintiff" and nodded assent to his claims. "That
man is right," he exclaimed, "and he must have justice done," but
when the defendant came presenting the other side of the case, the
king arose in indignation and left the court room with the words
:
"That fellow is also right. Judge, see to it that the case be decided."
This ended his tampering with the administration of justice in the
courts.
History repeats itself. Frederick the Great, too, was impressed
with the idea, that the method of deciding right and wrong by a
conflict of arguments between two parties was not the proper way,
and so he introduced a new method in which the courts took the
decision into their own hands; and the judge instead of acting as
an umpire between two combatants whose weapons are not clubs
but arguments, should investigate the cjuestion without reference to
the parties and pronounce his decision purely from the standpoint
of justice.
The reform was introduced and tried for some time, but had
tinall}- to be abolished because the system did not work. Under it
both parties were dissatisfied because they appeared now as two
criminals before a sovereign, and Frederick the Great soon recog-
nized that the contending parties had a right to have their views
represented as they saw it, and not as the court would have them
see it. The ability to make one's own view of the case plausible, is
part of the struggle for justice. JNIisrepresentations are used to make
right appear wrong, but the judge is expected to see through the
machinations of tricksters, and if decisions are wrong it becomes
apparent that the fault is not in the system of justice but in the in-
sufficient qualifications of the personnel.
The best way after all is to let the parties struggle for their
rights, although an able misrepresentation may now and then prove
successful. In criminal cases misrepresentation is even deemed the
weapon of the defendant which it would be psychologically wrong
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to take away from him. Upon this consideration is based the prin-
ciple that it is wrong to have a defendant make his statements on
oath lest he aggravate his case by perjury. A defendant in a crim-
inal case may insist on being sworn, but no one can compel him to be.
It almost seems as if justice were a sham and right were nothing
but the power of the stronger to enforce his will, either directly by
his own power, or by utilizing the authority of the state to have his
view of the case presented with convincing ability. This is true
only in a limited sense. It would be a mistake to think that justice
is a mere random settlement between the contending parties, for
there is justice in the world. But justice is not a fact. It is an
ideal which must be worked out by humanity and is approximated
more and more in the progress of human civilization.
All events of nature, the movements of the starry heavens as
well as the atomic dances of the molecule, are subject to law, and
the actions of man are no exception. In the domain of human so-
ciety it is natural for the strong to make use of their power, yet
their power is checked by laws imposed upon them by the common
will of all, and the wise who possess foresight restrain themselves
and do not make a full use of their power when they see that they
will not be able to maintain an advanced or aggressive position.
He is called just who voluntarily concedes to his opponents what
they could enforce in a struggle for justice.
In the animal world the natural impulse of making immediate
use of power is freely followed. The tiger does not stop to consider
the results of his action, but pounces on his prey and feeds on living
animals with ruthless cruelty. A new condition, however, sets in
with the rise of intelligence. It is beneath the dignity of man,
—
nay more, it is against his interests to follow the blind impulses of
his own power, and the recognition of the laws of social interconnec-
tions teach him that it will be wiser to make a limited use of his
power and not enforce it to its full extent. Experience teaches us
that a reckless disregard of the rights of our neighbors leads to our
own discomfiture, sometimes even to our own destruction. Society
with its intricate interrelations is like a living organism where one
hand can not lacerate another limb with impunity, for all must work
in harmony for the sake of their own welfare, and there are certain
underlying laws (i. e., laws of nature) governing the welfare of a
social body. These natural laws of the welfare of the whole organ-
ism teach a mutual respect for the several individuals constituting
it, and they form the eternal prototype of ethics and of the institu-
tions of justice.
JUSTICE, ITS NATURE AND ACTUALIZATION. 357
Some modern jurists as well as ethicists have come to the con-
clusions that the old ideas of a natural right, of eternal justice, of
an ideal moral law, are mere fictions, and that all our notions of right
and wrong are based solely upon a traditionally established custom
of law and of social habits. But this view comes as a reaction
against a wrong- formulation of the old idea of divine law, or
natural law, or by whatever name the conception of an eternal proto-
type of right may go. Though the interpretation or formulation of
a prototype of right may have been too mythical or dressed up in
fantastic allegory, it is after all not incorrect; for just as natural
law guides the development of the world, there is a natural law
that dominates history and the evolution of human society.
A man from the ranks of practical life who has no experience
as yet with the intricacies of law, naturally feels that there is an
eternal rule of justice though we may be unable to formulate it.
His interpretation of it may be erroneous, but at bottom he is right,
and indeed all our law is nothing but an attempt to incorporate the
maxims of this eternal justice based on the natural laws that govern
the development of human society.
The philosophy of law has made great progress and we have
no doubt that the scientific world-conception which is now spread-
ing will usher in a new period in the administration of law. We
agree with Dr. Lindorme that the law of the future will be more
preventive than punitive. It will tend more to encourage the good
than to retaliate on evil-doers. In addition, it will make the law
agree more with the demands and needs of the present generation
instead of making justice lag behind the times, as was the case with
our blue laws made a century ago in accordance with the views of
a distant past. But after all, actual justice in the world will remain
a settlement between contending" parties, and so long as life remains
a function, an activity, a struggle in a bodily world of conflicting-
interests, we will not be able to avoid the clash of diiTerent rights.
There will always be three rights, as Dr. Lindorme says : one of the
plaintifif, one of the defendant, one of the judge; or, as we would
prefer to say, three aspects, the views of the two parties and the
view of the judge. All we can do is to have our legal institutions
so constructed and the judges as well as the jurors so well prepared
for their duties that the court's decision will be as near as possible
to the living interpretation of the eternal law of justice which has
produced not only our ideal of justice, but also all our legal in-
stitutions.
We do not doubt that civilization is a powerful movement which
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leavens mankind more and more; but the development of justice
must grow gradually and we can not cut it loose from the root
from which it springs. Justice remains rooted in power, and the
development of international law can only be the outcome of a
further development of the civilized nations. Peace on earth can
not be established by idealists who as self-appointed apostles of
peace request the great powers of the world to disarm. The effect
of their conferences is not greater than if a lamb would go among
the wolves to preach a universal goodwill among all creatures.
Peace on earth can be established only when those powers them-
selves feel the need of peace, when they find that wars are too ex-
pensive and that the method of compromise is preferable. These
powers themselves must become the advocates of a peace policy
;
peace can not be established by persuasion, it must be enforced by
the threat of war,-^of a war which would mean sure defeat to the
recalcitrant and unruly. Every single power might be unwilling to
bring about the result of an assured state of international peace, but
in the measure that international relations develop enormous inter-
ests by peaceful trade, the common will becomes a factor which can
less and less be ignored, and this common will develops an inter-
national conscience of right and wrong, which of late has become
incorporated in the Peace Conference of The Hague, which will
exert its influence more and more upon the amicable settlement of
international disputes. But even here as everywhere justice will
always have its ultimate foundation in power, and justice will remain
forever an ideal approximated by a comparison between conflicting
rights.
